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PARKLAND HILLS BLUE LICK WATER Co. v. HAWKINS' COURT-
OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.
The name "Blue Lick Water," having been notoriously used for more-
than a century to designate the water of certain springs known by that
name since their first discovery, is a good trade-name, in the hands of
lessees of said spring, as against the owners of an artesian well in
another locality, who have given the name "Blue Lick" to the water
of their well, -with a view to deceive the public into a belief that it came.
from the Blue Lick Springs.
GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES AS TRADE-NAMES.
The terms "trade-mark " and "trade-name" are frequently-
used indiscriminately to denote the same thing; but in strict
usage the trade-mark is the brand put upon the goods, includ-
ing both the name and the sign usually joined therewith,.
while the trade-name is the designation given to the goods,
without reference to the other signs used on the brand. In
this correct sense the trade-name is only a part of the trade-
mark, and the two terms cannot, with propriety, be used
interchangeably.'. For example, in the principal case, the
trade-name was "Blue Lick Water," while the trade-mark
consisted of a figure of Daniel Boone, with the date of his.
discovery of the springs, the trade-name and the name of the
proprietor, the trade-name thus forming but a comparatively
small part of the trade-mark.
I. A trade-name must necessarily be more or less unique,
in order to entitle its owner to its exclusive use. "Smith's
'Reported in 26 S. W. Rep. 389.
514.
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Hair Tonic" may be manufactured by any man named Smith,
and none of the family can lay claim to the exclusive use of
that name to denote his hair tonic. But if he choose to call
it "Smith's Excelsior Hair Tonic," he may prevent any other
Smith from copying that title as a whole; and so if he call it
"John Smith's Hair Tonic," as against Thomas, Henry,
William, Peter, or any other Smith except another John. The
reason of this is, that any man has a right to use his own
name in his business, so long as he does not deceive others
into the belief that that business is identical with someone's
else, and therefore no one can prevent his so using it in good
faith; but if he invents an arbitrary or fanciful name or com-
bination of names not used before, he has a right to use it to
the exclusion of others.
II. Applying these principles to the use of geographical
names, it is plain that, as a general rule, the use of the name
of a locality as a trade-name confers no proprietary right upon
the user, as against others doing business or manufacturing in
the same place, even though he be the first in the field.
"When a name is used by a manufacturer in a purely
geographical sense, as indicating that his goods are manufac-
tured there, any one may also use it in that sense, provided
he does not so use it as to induce the belief that his goods are
the goods of manufacturers previously established there;"
Ld. Hannen, in Montgomery v. Thompson [I89I], App. Cas.
217. "No one can apply the name of a district of country
to a well-known article of commerce, and obtain thereby such
an exclusive right to the application as to prevent others
inhabiting the district or dealing in similar' articles coming from
the district from truthfully using the same designation. It is
only when the adoption or imitation of what is claimed to be a
trade-mark amountq to a false representation, express or
implied, designed or incidental, that there is any title to relief
against it. True, it may be that the use by a second producer
in describing truthfully his product, of a name or a combina-
tion of words already in use by another, may have the effect of
causing the public to mistake as to the origin or ownership of
the product, but if it is just as true in its application to his
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goods as it is to those of another who first applied it, and who
therefore claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no legal
or moral wrong done:" Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311;
Evans v. Von Laer, 32 Fed. Rep. 153; Brooklyn White Lead
Co. v. Masury, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 416; Candee, Swan & Co. v.
Deere, 54 Ill. 439; Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. 467;
Siegert v. Abbott, 61 Md. "276; S. C. 48 Am. Rep. ioi;
Laughman's App., 24W. N. C. 465; S. C., 18 Atl. Rep. 415;
Am. Brewing Co. v. St. L. Brewing Co., 47 Mo. App. 14.
III. This rule, however, is subject to several qualifications.
Though, as we have seen, the mere fact that the use of the
name by another may mislead the public into a belief that his
product is the same as that of the first user of the name, is
no reason for prohibiting such use, yet that use must be in
good faith, not with the intent to so mislead purchasers. Any
fraudulent use of the name will be enjoined: Siegert v.
Abbott, 61 Md. 276; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. IOI; Evans v. Von
Laer, 32 Fed. Rep. 153; Siegert v. Findlater, 7 Ch. D. 8oi.
Accordingly, when a geographical name- has, by long usage,
acquired a secondary meaning, as denoting a particular pro-
duct, such as "Worcestershire Sauce," a use of that name to
induce the belief that the article was the same, and not merely
to denote the place of manufacture, will be enjoined: Lea v.
Wolff, I Thomp., &C., 626; S. C., 46 How. Pr. 157; 15 Abb.
Pr. N. S. I, reversing on this point S. C., 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 389.
A curious instance of mental perversion on this point is to
be found in another "Worcestershire Sauce" case: Lea v.
Deakin, I I Biss. C. Ct. 23. There the court held that when
a name has become generic in meaning as "Worcestershire"
in this case, and denotes a special kind of product, it cannot
be appropriated as a trade-mark. The confusion rises from the
use of the word "generic." Words denoting a special quality
,of goods, which anyone may manufacture, such as "four-ply".collars, "lager" or "bock" beer, "rye" whisky, etc., cannot
be appropriated by anyone. But the very essence of a trade-
mark or trade-name is that it denotes something that no one
else can manufacture, as in this case, the principal case, and
,others to be mentioned hereafter.
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IV. The intent to deceive may be inferred, and in fact taken
as an irrefutable presumption, from the fact that the goods of
the second user of the name are not manufactured at the
place in question, or do not come from it. It is the very
nature of a lie to deceive. M'Andrew v. Bassett, IO Jur.
N. S. 492; Braham v. Beachim, 7 Ch. D. 848; Blackwell v-
Dibrell, 3 Hughes C. Ct. 15 ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn.
v. Piza, 24 Fed. Rep. 149; Southern White Lead Co. v. Cary,
39 Fed. Rep. 492; A. F. Pike Mfg. Co. v. Cleveland Stone Co.,
35 Fed. Rep. 896; Newman v. Alvord, 51 N. Y. 189; afC'.
S. C., 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 588; El. Modello Mfg. Co. v. Gato, 25
F~la. 886; S. C., 7 So. Rep. 23; Parkland Hills Blue Lick Water
Co. v. Hawkins, the principal case (Ky.), 26 S.W. Rep. 389.
There is but one case in opposition to this current of
authority: N. Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44L
Fed. Rep. 277 ; aff. 45 Fed. Rep. 212 ; in which the plaintiff,
a manufacturer of" Rosendale" cement, at that place, sought
to enjoin the use of the term "Rosendale" by the defendant,
whose place of manufacture was elsewhere. The court refused
the injunction, on the groind that such a doctrine would
permit any actual manufacturer of or dealer in "Dresden "
china or "Irish" linen, to bring suit against all those who
falsely called their products or wares by such names; in the
second place, that the wrong was against the public, rather
than against the manufacturers; and in the third place, that
if any private wrong was done, all manufacturers at Rosendale
were injured alike, and the plaintiff could not suppott its case
without showing an exclusive right to the name. But when
there is a clear injury, and an equally clear remedy, the courts
have no business with possible consequences (to say nothing-
of the fact that courts of deeper wisdom and sounder judg-
ment have failed to perceive these direful bugaboos); there is-
a clear private wrong in deluding the public into a belief that
one man's goods are those of another, and so lessening the
sales of the latter; and the question of right, as between one
who has a right, though partial, and one who has none, is not
affected by the rights of third parties. On every ground, the
ruling in the Rosendale case is wholly wrong.
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V. It does not matter that the goods or products of the
second user of the name are the same in quality as those of
the first. If they do not in fact come from the same'locality
he has no right to represent them as such. Thus, when the
plaintiff owned nearly all the coal lands in Radstock parish,
and sold it herself as the product of the" Radstock Collieries;"
and the defendants, who had previously been coal merchants
in Radstock, under the title of the Radstock Coal Company,
bought a colliery outside of that parish, which nevertheless
produced the same grade of coal, known to the trade as Rad-
stock coal, and began to sell it under the name of "Radstock
Colliery Proprietors, &c.," they were enjoined from using that
name until they should own a colliery in Radstock, or secure
the right to handle coal mined in the parish: Braham v.
Beachim, 7 Ch. D. 848. So, where coal from the Lochgelly
collieries had been known for many years as " Lochgelly
Coal," and was the only coal so known in the market, though
a seam known as the Lochgelly splint seam extended .under
other estates as well, the lessees of the mineral rights of an
adjoining estate were enjoined from advertising their coal as
Lochgelly Splint Coal, though the name was true enough,
and were ordered to advertise it only as Lumphinnans Splint
Coal, Lochgelly seam (presumably to avoid any possible risk
of deception): Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. Christie, 6 Ct. of
Session Cas. (4 th Ser.) 482. This case goes farther than any
other on the subject, but no one can deny that it did exact
justice, with a more scrupulous regard than usual for the
rights of the parties.
VI. Even when the goods are manufactured.or produced
at the place in question, if the name of the place is used
fraudulently, or if the manufactory has been located with a
view to obtaining the advantage of the name to the detriment
of the other, the use of the name will be enjoined. In Seixo
v. Provezende, I L. R. Ch. 192, the name of a district in Spain
had long been used to denote the wines grown on one estate
in that district; and it was ruled that the name could not be
applied to wines from another estate of the same district,
so as to mislead the purchasers. In Wotherspoon v. Currie,
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-5 L. R. H. L. 5o8, the plaintiff, who had originally carried on
the manufacture of "Glenfield" starch at Glenfield, a little
place of some sixty inhabitants, had removed his factory,
retaining the name. The defendant had purchased a small lot
at Glenfield, and carried on the manufacture of starch there,
also using the name "Glenfield" to denote his starch. But,
in view of the fact that the whole scheme was intended to
induce people to believe that the defendant's starch was the
plaintiff's, an injunction against the use of the name was held
proper.
So, in Thompson v. Montgomery, 41 Ch. D. 35, the plain-
tiffs below and their predecessors had carried on a brewery in
Stone (a town of Staffordshire of about six thousand inhabi-
tants) since 1780, using the name "Stone Ales" to designate
their product. The defendant, vzho had previously sold their
product, put up a brewery at Stone, and used the word
"Stone" in connection with liquor of his own manufacture,
with a view, in the opinion of the trial judge, to lead the
public to the belief that the ales he was then selling were
those of the former firm." An injunction was accordingly
granted, and affirmed on appeal. The case was then carried
to the House of Lords, and there the decision was reaffirmed,
though there was a doubt in the minds of some of the Lords
as to the question of the use of the name "Stone:" Mont-
gomery v. Thompson [I89I], App. Cas. 217. This precise
,question has not yet risen in the United States; but it is to be
hoped that when it does it will be decided in accordance with
the just doctrine laid down above.
VII. There is another class of cases to which the foregoing
reasoning applies with special force-where the goods to
which the trade-name is attached are the products of only
the one locality, and the plaintiff has the exclusive right to
manufacture or deal there; or where the name of the locality
is an arbitrary and fanciful one, as that of a mineral spring.
In these cases there is every reason for holding that he has an
exclusive right to the name of the locality as a trade-name.
' A trade-mark may be a name adopted and used by a mer-
-chant or dealer, in order to designate the goods that he sells,
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and distinguish them from those sold by another, to the end
that they may be known in the market as his, and thus enable
him to secure such profits as result from the celebrity of his
wares, or a reputation for superior skill, industry, or enter-
prise, in handling the articles put on the market. Any name
may be so used that he may deem appropriate, as designating
the true origin or ownership of the article to which it is
affixed, though he may not appropriate a name indicative of
the quality of his goods, which others may employ with e4ual
truth for the same purpose. There is no conceivable reason
why the name of a place may not be selected as a trade-mark,
or a natural product of a spring be the subject of the protec-
tion afforded by it:" Parkland Hills Blue Lick Water Co. v.
Hawkins, the prihcipal case (Ky.), 26 S. W. Rep. 389. Ac-
cordingly the name Congress: Congress Spring Co. v. High
Rock Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 29 1; aff. S. C., Io Abb. Pr. N. S.
(N. Y.) 348; Bethesda: Dunbar v. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118;
and Blue Lick: Parkland Hills Blue Lick Water Co. v. Haw-
kins, supra, have been held valid trade-names, and protection
granted against others who attempted to use them, to the
injury of the owners of the springs. In these cases, as in the
"Worcestershire Sauce" case; Lea v. Wolff, I Thomp. &C.,
(N. Y.) 626; S.C., 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) i57; 15 Abb. Pr.
N. S. I. And the "Stone Ales" case: Thompson v. Mont-
gomery, 41 Ch. D. 35; Montgomery v. Thompson [i89i],
App. Cas. 217; the use of the place name has become
secondary, and denotes the product itself, rather than the
place of its production..
VIII. But while the name of a place may not be used
singly as a trade-name, to the exclusion of others doing
business there, it may be so used in connection with other words,
either the name of the dealer or manufacturer: Candee, Swan
& Co. v. Deere, 54 Ill. 439; or an arbitrary word or com-
bination of words, as "Maryland Club:" Cahn v. Gottschalk,
2 N. Y. Suppl. 13. And in the same way an arbitrary use of
a geographical term, to denote an article that is not in reality,
nor in the nature of things could be manufactured there and
sold at the place of sale, will make it a valid trade-name, as
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"Vienna" bread: Fleishmann v. Schuckmann, 62 How.
(N. Y.) Pr. 92.
IX. The results of the preceding discussion may be thus
summarized: I. A geographical term cannot be used as a
trade-name to the exclusion of others doing business in the
same place, and using it in good faith to designate the place
of manufacture of their goods or their place of business.
2. But it may be so used as against any one who attempts to
make a fraudulent use of it to the injury of the first user,
whether he be an outsider or be engaged in business at the
place in question. 3. When the name of the place has become
so associated with the product as to lose its local force and
acquire a secondary meaning denoting the special product, it
will be considered a valid trade-name. 4. When so associated
with other words or combinations of words, as to acquire a
fanciful or arbitrary meaning, it is a good trade-name. 5- When
used arbitrarily, without any possible reference to locality, it is
also a good trade-name.
R. D. S.
